

Demetri Kofinas: 00:00:00 Today's episode of Hidden Forces is made possible by listeners like you. For more information about this week's episode or for easy access to related programming, visit our website hiddenforces.io and subscribe to our free email list. If you listen to the show on your Apple podcast app, remember you can give us a review. Each review helps more people find the show and join our amazing community. And with that, please enjoy this week's episode.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:00:48 What's up everybody? My guest today is David Kilcullen, a theorist and practitioner of guerrilla and unconventional warfare, and counterterrorism with extensive operational experience, over a 25 year career, with the Australian and U.S. governments as an army officer, analyst, policy advisor and diplomat.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:01:11 He served in Iraq as senior counterinsurgency advisor to U.S. general, David Petraeus. Was senior advisor to U.S. secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice and has served in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, and Colombia. He's professor of international and political studies at the University of new South Wales, Canberra, and he's the author of five prize winning books on terrorism, insurgency, and future warfare, including his latest, *The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West*.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:01:47 I know that I've said this a number of times about prior conversations with other guests, but I have to say it again because this really was one of the best episodes that I have ever done. It deals mainly with the evolution of warfare and the threat environment that we currently face, including an extensive analysis of Chinese and Russian conventional and unconventional methods of warfare that target the West.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:02:18 But we also couldn't ignore what's been happening in the world and in the U.S. with the spread of the coronavirus, what's now been officially declared to be a global pandemic by the World Health Organization and the emergency measures that are being put into place as we speak, both at a national and state level, both here in the United States but also across every major developed and developing economy hit by this growing epidemic.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:02:46 The conversation speaks for itself and in fact, we dove right into our discussion without the usual introduction. So, the first 50 seconds or so is going to sound a little distorted because David hadn't started recording his end of the conversation yet, but like I said, that only lasts for less than a minute, so you don't have to worry about it for the rest of the episode.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:03:09 I hope you're all managing this turbulent and stressful time as best as possible. I think we're all doing our best and I can promise you that I'm going to be doing my very best to continue to bring you the most insightful, educational and relevant conversations I can on the things that matter most to all of us while we try and navigate this difficult, but also opportunity filled time together.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:03:41 And with that, please enjoy this timely thought-provoking and deeply informative conversation with my guest, Dr. David Kilcullen.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:03:56 For someone like you, I imagine this is like par for the course, right?

David Kilcullen: 00:04:03 I think this is a slightly unusual set of circumstances given how rapidly it's spread, you could almost say it's gone viral, but I think-

Demetri Kofinas: 00:04:13 [crosstalk 00:04:13] intended.

David Kilcullen: 00:04:14 I wrote a piece this morning for our newspaper in Australia where I made the point that it's very interesting to compare the global coordinated relatively collaborative response to the 2008 financial crisis to the pretty scattered and sort of finger pointing blame shifting response that we're seeing now.

David Kilcullen: 00:04:36 And I do think that part of the reason for that is just loss of confidence in elites, and experts, and the conventional wisdom, and the leadership generally that we've seen globally in that time.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:04:50 It's really interesting you say that. I was thinking the exact same thing these days. I was taking that one of the main differences between the 2008 crisis, putting aside the nature of the crisis, the fact that was a credit crisis, this one is happening in an environment where there's far less credibility in governments and also much more dysfunction in the global, not just the global security environment, but also in terms of relations between countries-

David Kilcullen: 00:05:18 Yeah.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:05:19 ... both globally and within the West itself. And I think that does make it more unnerving because whether it was true or not that governments could do anything effective in the last crisis, people draw comfort in the idea that the fed expanding its balance sheet, the government enacting fiscal stimulus, the tax cuts, whatever, that that's going to fix it.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:05:45 And it's also interesting that the solution to everything that has been offered for years in this country at least, and I think it's also true in certain other places for sure in the West, is that money is the solution to everything.

David Kilcullen: 00:06:00 Yeah.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:06:01 And that's what we see here with the fed, with this multi trillion dollar packages, as if this is the solution, right?

David Kilcullen: 00:06:07 Yeah.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:06:08 It's kind of wacky.

David Kilcullen: 00:06:09 Yeah. It's interesting because this particular challenge poses a dilemma. You can let it burn from a health standpoint and who knows how many million people will probably die, but the global economy will continue to roll. Or you can shut down economic activity in order to preserve life. And for the vast majority of people, they won't experience anything significant from a health standpoint, but they might lose their jobs.

David Kilcullen: 00:06:37 I was supposed to speak next week at South by Southwest, which has been obviously canceled. That's not a big deal for me. It's a gigantic deal for the city of

Austin and whatever it is, 100,000 jobs that are tied to the festival. So, this is dilemma, but are you going to prioritize the financial and economic impact or are you going to prioritize the health impact?

- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:07:00 100%. And also, there's another problem, which is that we're not China. And so, if we shut down the economies, it's one thing for a multinational corporation, it has credit lines, it has a cash balance, it has the capacity, let's say, to pay salaries over a period of time. But a small business, no way.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:07:23 A small business doesn't have the capacity to do that, so how are people supposed to feed themselves? What I foresee in this situation, the way things are going is that we're going to come out I'm afraid that in an understandable, and I'm not debating whether this should be done or not. I think that we need to take the measures we need to take. I'm concerned about what the country looks like when we wake up on the other side of this.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:07:48 And to some extent that depends on how far away that other side is and just as one day in point, I don't know if you saw this, but the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson this morning said that they anticipate the infection cases in the UK will keep rising until about the middle of June, second or third week of June and then start to come down.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:08:11 And a friend of mine who I trust, who works for the National Health Service in the UK and is part of the coronavirus response told me last week that they think it's going to go for six to nine months. So, there's a significant difference between acute crisis that's over by the end of April and a sustained crisis that keeps rolling until... Six to nine months from now is basically end of the year.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:08:35 So I think people have to get their heads around this stuff early. I think there's a sense that some people might have now that someone's overreacting, but of course the way these virus things work, you have to seem that you're overreacting early, otherwise you'll be playing catch up.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:08:55 If there's a 14-day incubation period and we're testing people on the basis of who has symptoms now, then we actually don't know where the virus is now, we know where it was 14 days ago. Right. So-
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:09:07 Yeah, which is super scary.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:09:07 Yeah. By definition we're playing catch up. Unless you want to go pretty hard early, you are going to continue to play catch up. It's funny you mentioned about the difference between China and Western countries, and Thomas Friedman has this thing about, I wish we could be China for a day, and I've been thinking about that, watching the Chinese response.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:09:27 Because the question in my mind is, okay, but which day of the crisis would you want to be China? Would you want to be China right at the beginning when they arrested and forced to apologize the doctor who first called attention to the virus in Wuhan? Or would you want to be them a couple of months later when they built an entire hospital in a week?

David Kilcullen: 00:09:50 Yes, they can respond in an incredibly draconian manner, drawing all the resources of the state together when they need to, but they also can have these deadly Chernobyl like inability to respond because they can't be honest with themselves about what's going on.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:10:08 How do you think we're going to manage this as someone who spent a good part of his life in war zones looking at countries and governments and all sorts of stressful situations?

David Kilcullen: 00:10:20 I think there are a lot of resiliencies in the U.S. population in particular that are going to stand us in good stead. I do think we tend to rally around and help each other when things go wrong. I also think that there are some special features to this virus that might make it a source of cohesion.

David Kilcullen: 00:10:40 In my very early 50s I don't have any symptoms of the coronavirus. Even if I do get sick, it's extraordinarily unlikely that it'll be fatal or even particularly severe, but I have people I love, they're in my 80s. I just canceled an event for this coming weekend with former Senator Gary Hart, not because I think I'm in any risk or any young people are, but because we don't want to transmit the virus to old people.

David Kilcullen: 00:11:09 You might not be personally at risk, but lots of people that would be, and I think this is about rallying around and saying, "We need to all do our part in order to protect people we love." And frankly, in the U.S. scenario, if the government tried to go door to door welding people into their apartments like the Chinese did, small matter of the second amendment, you would have a significant problem.

David Kilcullen: 00:11:33 But instead of doing that, if the government would have just asked people, "Hey, think carefully before you do your normal daily activities and think about others," I think that's actually more likely to succeed in the U.S., or say in Australia, or the U K than some other cultures.

David Kilcullen: 00:11:49 So I think we have some resiliencies but unfortunately I'm not seeing a lot of strong, let's say clear communication from the top right now, so it's hard to know how it's going to play out.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:12:00 Major, major problem in terms of leadership. In fact, I think I would love to get your take on the importance of that given your experience, but to your point about welding people in their homes, I think it seems to me from what I understand about this virus because of how contagious it is and because we're in a place of mitigation, the goal here is not to prevent it from spreading, it's to delay the spread so that the infections can happen in a way where the hospital system can manage that.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:12:37 China could be a complete mess right now because like you said, they went from one extreme to now they're letting people back in the factories. What are they going to be dealing with in the next few weeks or in a month?

David Kilcullen: 00:12:47 One of the questions that a lot of health professionals I talked to are worried about is whether we will get a second wave here in the late part of the year as

happened with the 1918 influenza where it came back much more dangerously and different towards the end of the year after spring first wave. And I think if we get re-infection in China, that'll be a whole different story.

- David Kilcullen:** 00:13:15 But just to sort of loosely link this to the book, I think a lot of people are blaming lack of preparation and lack of leadership on President Trump. There's obviously some truth to that, absolutely, but I think it's worth pointing out that President Trump being elected in the first place is a symptom of people losing confidence in the conventional wisdom, and in elites, and in authority figures, and in experts.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:13:47 And he like other populous leaders who've been elected in the last few years in Western countries I think in part he's a symptom of a deeper issue. And one of the key elements in that sort of loss of civilizational confidence that we've seen in the last 20 years is that we've had an extended series of protracted wars where we keep being told we've got the best military in the world, and yet somehow, we can't deliver success.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:14:14 And people have lost relatives and friends or lost limbs to the war. They don't see any end in sight and our sort of failure to deliver on that extraordinarily important issue while simultaneously telling people, "Hey, we have the most awesome military in the world." Over time, people start to think, these idiots don't know what they're talking about.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:14:37 And I think what we're seeing with the coronavirus is an aspect of a broader, let's call it an elite collapse or a failure of confidence in the systems, in institutions that it's really difficult to separate that from 20 years of inconclusive and largely failed military activity.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:14:58 That's insightful. I agree and I think it's true, both in terms of the solutions that we've attempted to solve political problems or socioeconomic problems through military means, and I think we've done the same thing with money. We've made big promises, our leaders and policymakers have promised.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:15:21 You're bringing up the Iraq war, I'm imagining 20 years, the promise there was that we would be in and out.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:15:27 Yeah.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:15:27 The promise there was that it was going to be easy. This might be a good time for you to give our audience a sense of who you are, your background, your service in the military, and your time as an advisor, both to Petraeus, to Condoleezza Rice. You have a very distinguished career, so maybe you could give us your background right now.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:15:47 I don't know if it's distinguished exactly. I think I was in the wrong place at the wrong time quite a few times, but. I'm Australian originally, as you can tell from the accent. I'm a professor at a university in Australia, the University of New South Wales in Canberra. It's one of the big, they call them the group of eight, the big eight state universities in Australia.

David Kilcullen: 00:16:08 I had about 25 years in the Australian regular military. Went through the Australian Military Academy, was an infantry officer, served all over Southeast Asia and the Pacific. And in the 1990s, I started doing my PhD on Islamic extremism and its relationship with terrorism. And the army at the time sort of said, "Why aren't you doing this again?" It didn't seem particularly important in the 1990s.

David Kilcullen: 00:16:38 I went through a lot of field work and eventually did my PhD in discipline called Political Anthropology, which is a little different from Cultural Anthropology, but looking at the impact on local level populations of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. And I finished my dissertation about eight weeks before 9/11. So, first example of wrong place, wrong time.

David Kilcullen: 00:17:07 And I'd been working my way up the army chain of command and was going to commander regimen and so on. And at that point people said, "Hey, look, this 9/11 things happened. We don't have a clear idea where a lot of these guys are coming from. Does anybody know anything about it?" And the army said, "Oh, we have a guy."

David Kilcullen: 00:17:26 So I ended up working for the Australian civilian government, and then for the U.S. government, helping people to get a grip of what was going on in the broader war on terrorism. And I had been an opponent of invading Iraq in the period up to 2003, I thought it was extraordinarily bad idea for a variety of reasons, which frankly, if I was in the military, I wouldn't have believed my argument.

David Kilcullen: 00:17:54 I was a counterinsurgency expert. I'd spent 20 years looking at guerrilla warfare and my critique of Iraq was, "You guys are going to start an insurgency and it's going to spiral out of control." And everybody said, "Of course you think that you're a counterinsurgency guy." That's a fair enough criticism.

David Kilcullen: 00:18:12 Once the war started, and it did in fact spiral out of control, I got pulled in to the Pentagon to help figure out how to deal with that. I ended up working for a guy called Dave Petraeus at the time running the training element of the army. We wrote as part of our broader writing team, the counterinsurgency manual, and then he got the gig as commander in Iraq at the beginning of the surge in 2007, asked me to come along as his senior advisor for counterinsurgency.

David Kilcullen: 00:18:45 And I should say, Petraeus, didn't need my advice, I wasn't advising him. I was advising the units that were already in Iraq and all of their Iraqi counterparts on how to deal with the insurgency and how to apply the new constructs that General Petraeus had come up with. It was an extraordinarily successful few months in Iraq.

David Kilcullen: 00:19:08 Of course, that success didn't last. We got about a 96% reduction in violence in about a six month period. I was called back to Washington and Secretary Condoleezza Rice, who was my boss, I was working for the State Department at the time, asked me to try to do something similar in Afghanistan and I ended up working for another general called Stanley McChrystal focused on basically trying to apply some of the same ideas from Iraq to Afghanistan.

David Kilcullen: 00:19:38 And it was pretty clear to me right from the outset that it wasn't going to work for a variety of reasons that we can get into if you want, but primarily because Afghanistan is just a very different society from Iraq. Principles translate from one campaign to another, but techniques very rarely do. And this is one case where we tried the template ideas from Iraq to Afghanistan and it just didn't transfer particularly well.

David Kilcullen: 00:20:02 Anyway. So, I got out of the government in 2009. I started my own research company in 2010 and for the last 10 years or so, I've been working in a whole variety of war zones and conflict affected areas, doing a number of different things. Researching violence against civilians, figuring out ways to limit that, advising private companies and governments on particular crisis issues that they're dealing with, do a fair bit of work with NGOs.

David Kilcullen: 00:20:32 And because of my sort of particular set of skills to channel a Liam Neeson, I often get asked by humanitarian NGOs to talk with armed groups and so on. So, I've had a worm's-eye view of a lot of the stuff that's gone on since 9/11 and I've written a number of books trying to bring that worm's eye perspective together with what we know from the broader theoretical perspective on how this stuff works.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:21:01 So a lot to discuss there. First of all, I want listeners to know how much I really enjoyed your book. I think it's interesting because we recently did an episode with Peter Zeihan from the exact same studio actually. He was in Colorado and that was a geopolitical theoretical, conceptual conversation and his book was very educational for me.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:21:22 This one was also extremely educational. I've never read military theory. Maybe peripherally, but you also have such an eclectic interdisciplinary approach. You use evolutionary biology and mimetics, and even theory of mind comes in when you're talking about liminal approaches to warfare... no, sorry, conceptual when you're expanding the concept space.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:21:49 I actually can't remember the name of it off the top of my head.

David Kilcullen: 00:21:52 Reflexive control, Soviet idea.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:21:55 It's fascinating, it's such an informative book and I highly recommend it to everyone. Before I ask you the question that has come to mind, I just want to mention, when you talk about how you were against the Iraq war, there were a lot of people that were making similar, very intelligent, coherent arguments.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:22:15 I was the beneficiary of one of those people. He was my professor of U.S. Foreign Relations in junior year, the year that we invaded. And I was studying abroad in that semester, and I was in Madrid. I remember exactly where I was, Madrid glued to CNN at a friend's apartment during the decapitation strike that you talk about in the book. You talk about it basically as being a straight align from the highway of death in 1991 to the Dora Farms decapitation strike.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:22:51 I'd love to ask you, I guess there are two questions that come to mind. One is, where is this book that you've written, Dragons and Snakes? This will give you a

chance to tell our listeners what those two words mean, what they're metaphors for, where you got it from. How does this book fit in the evolution of your previous books, like *The Accidental Guerrilla*, *Counterinsurgency*, *Out of the Mountains and Blood Year*?

- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:23:15 And also how does *Dora Farms* fit into your larger conception of what went wrong and where we are in this world that we live in today?
- David Kilcullen:** 00:23:28 This is a long answer, so feel free to interrupt me as I go. But I think to talk about the dragons versus the snakes for a minute. The title comes from James Woolsey who President Clinton's CIA director, and in the U.S. government, the way that it works is if you get appointed to a position by a president, you have to be confirmed by the Senate.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:23:53 And so Woolsey was doing his Senate confirmation hearing in February of 1993, so about over 15 months since the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War and a member of the intelligence committee said to him, "Look, we've defeated the Soviet Union. It's the end of the Cold War. What do you think the threat environment is going to be like in the 1990s.?" And Woolsey said, "We've slain a large dragon," talking about the Soviet Union, "but now we find ourselves in a jungle filled with a brooding variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways the dragon was easier to keep track off."
- David Kilcullen:** 00:24:33 And he goes on to give an extraordinarily prescient description of the environment as it went on to exist in the 1990s and your listeners can find that online. It's on the intelligence committee website and it's incredibly insightful where he talks about essentially weak States, failing States and non-State actors as being the main threat in the 1990s and that's the category that I call snakes, Woolsey's snakes.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:25:02 The dragon or the dragons in this case are the State peer or near peer adversaries like Russia and China that we had been dealing with during the Cold War. And my argument in the book is that the dragons are back. After 20 years of focusing on non-state actors, from 1993 until 2003 we did peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency, and we dealt with some counter terrorism and counter narcotics issues, and that was the environment that I came up in as a young combat arms officer.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:25:38 After 2003, we narrowed our focus to just one snake, international extremist groups and in particular Islamic terrorism. And we became so sort of tunnel visioned on that one set of threats that everybody else started to adapt around us. Not only did the dragons watch and learn from how we struggled in Iraq and Afghanistan and come up with ways to fight us that avoided our strength, but also the snakes drew on this massive expansion in electronic connectivity, and smartphones, and GPS to build kind of a set of precision capabilities, which gave them a level of lethality that you used to have to be a nation state to attain.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:26:24 So we've got now dragons that fought a bit like snakes, we've got snakes that have the capacity to act like dragons. We're dealing with both snakes and dragons at the same time and in many of the same places. And our military

model, which we pioneered during the Gulf War in 1991 is just not working anymore against these groups.

- David Kilcullen:** 00:26:47 And I think that's part of the reason why the modern Western world, which we like to imagine is self-sustaining, but is actually supported by a particular military model, why it's starting to come apart at the seams because the military underpinnings of our modern way of life are just not functioning anymore.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:27:08 Let me pause there in case you want to interject, but we can talk about the Dora Farms strike too if you want.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:27:15 Maybe the best next question to really ask you, because I do want to get into who the dragons are, who the snakes are, and how they learned what they learned, and how they've evolved and really couch that in some of these theories of co-evolution and some of the other things you put forward, adaptive learning in the battlefield versus conceptual. But what is the Western approach to war?
- David Kilcullen:** 00:27:40 So this gets us to the Dora Farms and I do draw a line between 1991 and the Highway of Death, which people of a certain age will remember was of series of airstrikes that destroyed an extraordinarily large number of Iraqi armored and soft skin vehicles that were trying to pull out of Kuwait at the end of the Gulf War and literally incinerated an unknown number of Iraqi military and civilians as part of the sort of culminating destruction of the Iraqi military.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:28:14 And the 1991 Gulf War basically showed everybody how not to fight the United States. The Chinese in particular drew some really stark lessons from that campaign and it was basically, if you go out against the U.S. in the open, in daylight arrayed in a conventional fashion and you try to defeat the United States on the battlefield, the outcome is going to be some variation of the Highway of Death.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:28:40 And told us that was a very comforting story in the 1990s. We said that Western powers now are so dominant in warfare that it makes war a meaningless choice for any adversary and therefore we're going to create peace by superior firepower, better precision weapons, better surveillance systems, this kind of high tech version of warfare where we were essentially throwing money at the problem and high tech and saying that that was going to solve the issue.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:29:10 And two Chinese officers who I quote in the book described the American way of war that emerged from 1991 as, "Shooting birds with golden bullets." And mentioned that Stealth Bomber were literally worth their weight in gold and that only the United States would come up with such a ridiculously expensive way of waging war in order to avoid casualties.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:29:36 The 2003 Dora Farms strike is the book ends to that period. And that's the period in which it suddenly became obvious to everybody that, oh, you actually can fight the United States successfully, and you do it in a totally different way. Let me talk about the Dora Farms strike itself really quickly, but then talk about that other way of way.

David Kilcullen: 00:29:54 Immediately prior to the start of the war on the night of the 18th to 19th of March 2003, President George W. Bush and George and George tenet, who was the CIA director at the time and others became aware through a signals intelligence intercept that Saddam and his two sons, Uday and Qusay were going to be in a bunker at an area called the Dora Farms complex just outside Baghdad.

David Kilcullen: 00:30:21 And they made the decision to assassinate or to target and kill those three individuals through an incredibly sophisticated precision strike. Frankly, it was a tactical masterpiece. The U.S. Air Force pulled the strike together at no notice in about an eight hour period. They put two Stealth aircraft over Baghdad in literally the first minute of the war.

David Kilcullen: 00:30:49 The first thing the world or the Iraqis knew about it was when four gigantic guided bombs lit up the compound and simultaneously a whole series of Tomahawk missiles and other missiles that had been fired by other U.S. assets hit that compound. It was technical precision, but it was technology in the service of frankly a bit of a bankrupt strategic concept and a form of intelligence that was not really workable anymore.

David Kilcullen: 00:31:20 It turned out that the bunker where we thought Saddam was didn't exist, it had never existed. Saddam hadn't even been to that compound since 1995 and he wasn't there, and neither were his sons. And the strike destroyed its target, killed a number of civilians and wounded others according to a study by the International Red Cross.

David Kilcullen: 00:31:43 But it wasn't until a few weeks later when U.S. ground troops made it to the compound that they realized that the signals intelligence intercept was faulty, the intelligence was wrong, and the strike hit nothing. More importantly, it illustrates a point which the Chinese theorists and also Russians had pointed out, which is that to paraphrase, "The U.S. with its very advanced form of warfare could effectively put a bomb through whatever window it chooses to do but it can't really decide what's behind the window without knowing something about the society and having a strategy to respond to that." And we just didn't have that in Iraq.

David Kilcullen: 00:32:23 We were acting as if Saddam was the Wicked Witch of the East in the Wizard of Oz, and as soon as we killed him, the Iraqis would dance around like munchkins and welcome the Western invasion force. And of course, that's absolutely not what happened. We found an extraordinarily well organized insurgency and guerrilla warfare campaign that had been planned for at least a decade by the Iraqis that they seamlessly rolled into the moment we captured major cities.

David Kilcullen: 00:32:49 We completely misread how the Iraqis planned to fight the war. They themselves misread it too. Of course, they thought it was going to be an insurgency led by Saddam from hiding. He was quickly captured, but then Iraqi society turned into 165 different guerrilla groups all fighting us in this amorphous cell-based fashion, and our much vaunted military model that had been dominant since 1991 turned out to be actually pretty easy to defeat if you adopted different approaches.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:33:21 What's interesting is that during that period, all of America's resources were devoted towards the Middle East. The focus was the Middle East and the psyche of the body politic was also focused on that part of the world; Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, Al-Qaeda. It was what people were most terrified about.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:33:49 I do want to ask you how that threat evolved and the emergence of ISIS, because you talk about it at length in the book and it's worth discussing, it hasn't gone away. I think it's even more relevant given some of the recent turmoil on the Turkish-Syrian border as well as maybe what's going on now with Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Iran's recent strike last night of an Iraqi base that killed two Americans reportedly, I think and one Brit?

David Kilcullen: 00:34:20 Yeah.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:34:21 But I want to maybe ask you first, while this was happening, while America was focused on Iraq, the insurgency in Iraq and maintaining order in Afghanistan, what were the dragons, the Chinas and the Russias of the world, what lessons were they drawing from what was happening to America and its Western allies and partners in the region? And how did they implement those changes and towards what end?

David Kilcullen: 00:34:50 It's a huge question. One of the theorists who I draw on in the book is Steve Rosen, who is one of the leading theorists of military adaptation and innovation. And Steve makes the point that there are actually two modes in which people adapt. One is a sort of peacetime mode where what you're doing is, you're scanning the environment, you're seeing what's going on in the conflict space.

David Kilcullen: 00:35:14 You are drawing conclusions and coming up with concepts for how to adapt and improve, and then you're applying those in a relatively top down sort of conscious manner, kind of a conscious adaptation to the environment mode. The other mode is a wartime mode where you get into basically a co-evolutionary tit for tat adaptation where your adversary does something on the battlefield, so you respond, so they respond to you, so you respond to them.

David Kilcullen: 00:35:45 So they respond to you and you get into this back and forth, I call it an adaptive two-part dance in one part of the book. And we in that period were in wartime mode. We were responding to the threat on the ground, the threat was responding to us. We were adapting back and one of the side effects of that form of adaptation is that you see a lot of co-evolution in which we come to resemble our adversary in many ways.

David Kilcullen: 00:36:10 Meanwhile, Russia and China but also Iran to some extent and North Korea were watching us struggle, but they weren't caught up in the day-to-day wartime evolution mode. They weren't engaged in the conflicts that we were in. And so, they were able to watch and learn from our mistakes and we started to see active efforts to copy and to build capabilities that would counteract Western dominance.

David Kilcullen: 00:36:37 So in the Chinese case, we've seen three different strands of development. One focusing on maritime and Naval development. Your listeners may be aware that China, until really about five years ago, had been primarily a land-based power

since roughly the middle of the 15th century. The Chinese Communist Party fought a number of Wars, they were all land-based.

- David Kilcullen:** 00:37:01 They've had a number of small Naval skirmishes over the past 70 years of the Communist Party, but really China has not had an ocean going Navy capable of projecting power globally since really the middle of the 15th century. So it's a massive transformation to the global strategic environment to now have China with aircraft carriers, an entire fleet of submarines, a new class of ballistic missiles that can knock out an American aircraft carrier at a distance of about 2,500 miles, building a sort of militarized archipelago of islands in the South China sea.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:37:36 So this is one strand of development. Another was nuclear, so building nuclear capable submarines, expanding and improving the nuclear arsenal. And the third was what the Chinese originally called unrestricted warfare and later adopted formally as something called the Three Warfares doctrine, which focused on information warfare, they call it public opinion warfare, cyber, and on lawfare, they call it legal warfare. So, manipulating legal norms.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:38:07 And what I argue in the book is that they engaged in something that I call conceptual envelopment. So, realizing that the U.S. was dominant and Western allies aligned with the U.S. were dominant in a very narrowly defined particular form of conventional force-on-force warfare, the kind of stuff we've just been talking about.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:38:28 And that if they could get outside the space that we consider to be war, then A; we would struggle to recognize what they were doing as warlike, and B; they'd be free to expand and develop without running into a major competition with the U.S. And I suggest in the book that two really bad things can result when your adversary has a much, much broader definition of warfare than you do.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:38:52 One, you can be engaging in things that you consider to be normal peacetime interaction, but your adversary is running what they consider to be a warlike campaign against you and before you know it, you're in a conflict without even realizing it. The other thing which is even worse is that you can be engaging in things that seem normal and competitive to you, for example, trade wars or tariffs, both of which actually fit in the Chinese war fighting doctrine and your adversary can be interpreting those as acts of war. So, you can fighting people that you have no intention of fighting more or less through accident.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:39:29 I think the Russians were a little more reactive in their learning. They went through a series of conflicts internally and Chechnya and Dagestan and elsewhere in the 1990s, they hit rock bottom in the late 1990s at the end of the Yeltsin government with all kinds of internal problems and really their military had been in freefall through most of the 1990s even though military officers had engaged in a lot of learning and adaptation to improve their performance in places like Chechnya, but as a whole, the country was extraordinarily weakened after the 1990s.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:40:07 Under president Putin since then, we've seen this initially gradual but then rapidly accelerating recovery of military capability. And under the New Look

Reforms that were introduced in 2011, we've seen Russia really become again, a very major global military player and most notably by the invasion of Crimea and the barely covert intervention in Ukraine, but also through its essentially rescuing the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and establishing itself again as a major player in the Middle East and in North Africa.

- David Kilcullen:** 00:40:46 So while we've been engaged in this wartime adaptation mode, kind of tunnel vision on terrorism, our adversaries have been free enough to... or I should say our state adversaries, the dragons have been free enough to look at us, learn from our struggles, figure out how to adapt, and then apply this very conscious form of adaptation as ways of avoiding our strength. So
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:41:09 Let's really dig in here. First of all, I want to just point this out for listeners because there are hints of it when you speak about this. This is very much the way that you describe the evolution of military environments and relations between countries and threats is very much in a sort of ecological, biological sense, evolutionary biology, and there's a co-evolutionary type process.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:41:37 And from what I've been able to understand when you talk about this conceptual innovation versus wartime adaptation, no country, as I understand it, evolves only conceptually or only in wartime environments. There's a constant ebb and flow depending on who is backtracking and who is on the offensive at any moment in time. Is that correct?
- David Kilcullen:** 00:41:59 Yeah, that's absolutely correct. And I identify four different mechanisms of military adaptation, which we can talk about, but for sure it's always a mix.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:42:09 I'm happy to talk about those. Let's drill into each of these two countries because another thing that's also helpful is that you lay out these two different methodologies. One of them is theory of liminal warfare or liminal maneuver space for how Russia has adapted and evolved, and we already talked about conceptual envelopment for China.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:42:34 You lay these out in a very geospatial way. One, the liminal maneuver space is vertical escalation, whereas conceptual envelopment is horizontal in its form in the sense that it expands the scope of the battlefield to include things that most Americans traditionally wouldn't even consider to be within the theater of war, like financial markets or financial assets, or drug supply chains, et cetera.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:43:04 Maybe you can tell us where have Western strategists like yourself come up with theories about how the Chinese view or think about war and how important is Unrestricted Warfare? The book published by those two PLA senior colonels in February of 1999. How important was that in informing your views and the views of your compatriots?
- David Kilcullen:** 00:43:32 Very important. Let me just give a caveat though really quickly. I've been thinking about biological metaphors and analogies and using biological systems theory to think about adversaries for about 15 to 20 years. I wrote my first paper on this question back in 2002. I've always been extraordinarily reluctant to put this discussion out there into the public space because one of the things

we see in genocide, and guerrilla warfare, and terrorism is a dehumanizing of adversaries, talking about them as microbes and cockroaches and bacilli.

- David Kilcullen:** 00:44:13 And there's this dehumanizing effect that people sometimes apply to an adversary as a precursor for extraordinarily violent genocidal activity. And I can give you examples of that, but I'm sure people are familiar. So, I've always been very reluctant to do it. And the reason I've done it now is for two reasons.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:44:33 One, because the point I'm making is not that the enemy is like of microbe and we are clean in our lab coats, peering into the Petri dish from outside. I'm making the point that we're all like that. We're all experiencing the same combat Darwinism, the same adaptive pressure, and I'm trying to say that the adversary is the same as us.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:44:55 He's a human like us. He's adapting in environments very similar to what we're adapting in, except that in his case, he's adapting in an environment that we created in 1991, what evolutionary theorists would call a fitness landscape that punishes-
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:45:10 We've had a hand in shaping that fitness landscape.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:45:13 Yeah. In fact, we dominated it. Another analogy would be to say we're the apex predator in the ecosystem, everybody's adapting to us. But a fitness landscape is basically a way of thinking about different combinations of traits and an environment will punish certain behaviors and characteristics and reward others.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:45:30 And the dominant military player in military version of a fitness landscape sets the conditions that reward and punish certain kinds of behavior. And in so doing, whether consciously or unconsciously shapes the adaptation and evolution of everybody else. And my argument is that one reason why we're seeing all these very different adversaries come up with rather similar ways of operating is because they're all reacting to the same set of adaptive pressures, which we created after 1991.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:46:00 So I just want to caveat that by saying, I'm not trying to say the enemies is microbe, I'm trying to say we're all in the same boat, we're all in a combat ecosystem together. And I should say, some of these ideas are controversial in evolutionary theory, ideas about group selection in particular.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:46:16 I haven't yet decided whether this is just an analogy or whether it's a computationally valid observation of what's going on. There are theorists out there like Dominic Johnson at Oxford who do think of it and he's a population biologist by background who think about this stuff as a real true computationally valid observation of warfare.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:46:38 There are others who tend to think of it primarily as a metaphor. I'm sure I'm not qualified actually in the scientific literature to make that call, but I'm using a lot of ideas that others have also put forward to try to make sense of the adaptive behavior that we're seeing.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:46:54 It seems, having read your book, actually on the side of a particular page when you were discussing this, and I have quotes from Dominic Johnson in The Rundown for listeners who are subscribers to The Rundowns. I actually scribbled Goldilocks because to me it felt very much like the optimal environment for an adversary is one where it's not too hot, not too cold. It's not so easy that there's no stress.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:47:20 There's another great book or a concept by Nassim Taleb, Antifragile.

David Kilcullen: 00:47:25 Yeah.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:47:26 I'm sure you're familiar with it, but it's not an environment where there isn't enough stress so that you're not adapting, you're not changing, you're not evolving, you're not improving, but it's not so overwhelming that it causes extinction, that it kills off the adversary entirely.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:47:41 And it seems that the worst thing that you can do is engage an adversary in a competitively difficult environment in which that adversary can survive. That seems to be the worst of all outcomes.

David Kilcullen: 00:47:55 And that's a mechanism that we call artificial or unconscious artificial selection following Charles Darwin. And you could summarize it by saying that-

Demetri Kofinas: 00:48:04 Is that also combat Darwinism? I think [crosstalk 00:48:07]-

David Kilcullen: 00:48:07 Yeah, sort of. That's a broader term that people just use to describe both the natural selection and artificial selection effect. Natural selection is what we've actually been talking about. It's where just certain features in the environment reward or punish certain behaviors, and so over time certain behaviors come to dominate in a population of combat actors and that's natural selection at work.

David Kilcullen: 00:48:29 Artificial selection is basically where we have put just enough pressure on certain adversaries to make them better through adaptation but not enough to destroy them. So, we have actually bred a better class of terrorists over the last 20 years. And I use an example from Pakistan and one from Israel to show how if you put enough pressure on an adversary to make them better but not enough to destroy them, you actually end up with more of them and also a better class of adversary.

David Kilcullen: 00:48:57 But you talked about the low end of the pressure spectrum where you start to stagnate. I would argue that we are actually as the dominant players since 1991, that's the danger for us that we've been at the bottom end of the spectrum where no adversary has put enough pressure on us to force us to get better, and as a consequence, we've to some extent stagnated.

David Kilcullen: 00:49:19 Ross Douthat, the New York Times columnist has a book out now about decadence and I've only read part of it. I'd love to have a conversation with him about that because he's not coming from the same place as I am, but I'm reading his book through the lens of this idea of stagnation.

David Kilcullen: 00:49:35 And in part I think you can say that we're suffering from what you might call a victory disease where we've been the top dog for so long in a conventional sense that we haven't had the kinds of pressures that others have had to adapt and as a consequence, our model has stagnated.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:49:53 A disease of affluence.

David Kilcullen: 00:49:54 Yeah. Exactly.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:49:55 That's a term from diet and [crosstalk 00:49:57]-

David Kilcullen: 00:49:57 Yeah, you could argue this is a military version of obesity and diabetes that we've seen skyrocket in affluent Western societies, for sure.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:50:05 Let's go back to this point about conceptual envelopment because I want to really tie a neat bow around our discussion around China. And then I think we can begin to discuss Russia and some of the other players, and as well as what you think the best way forward for the United States is maybe in the overtime.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:50:27 I find this idea of conceptual envelopment or horizontal escalation to be not only fascinating, but it resonates. We did a number of episodes on China, but there's one that really sticks out and it was a conversation with a hedge fund manager by the name of Kyle Bass. He's based out of Texas.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:50:45 He is a member of a group, I can't remember the name now, but basically it deals with China and they've been ringing the alarm bell to basically say that, and he's been very explicit about this, that China has been at war with us for the better part of 20 years, and that their conception of war, their definition of Wars different than ours. And that when they buy a hotel near a Naval base as you talk about in the book, or when they distribute drugs, or opioids in the United States, that they don't see that simply as a commercial operation.

Demetri Kofinas: 00:51:29 That there is more behind that and that it's fair to assume that additionally, also because of the centralization of the Chinese political system, the centralization of the party, the government structure and then the corporations. Help me understand and for our listeners, how well established is this and what does it mean in practical terms? Where can we see examples of this strategy having been or currently being implemented?

David Kilcullen: 00:52:01 I should say that conceptual envelopment is my term. There are a number of other terms that are used, unrestricted warfare is one. Three Warfares is the official Chinese doctrinal term, but there are other people who describe it in different ways. Let's go back to the two guys who wrote the book Unrestricted Warfare.

David Kilcullen: 00:52:20 As you mentioned in February, 1999, two Chinese senior colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote a book which was explicitly about this question of 1991 and U.S. military dominance, and how should the China adapt to that. And they make a number of critiques of how the U.S. operates. They talk about weaknesses but also strengths in the U.S. system.

David Kilcullen: 00:52:49 And they make the point that the way to deal with this is to go to what they call warfare beyond rules to say we're going to expand the definition of war to the point where the battlefield is everywhere and warfare is everything. And in so doing, we're going to get outside that narrowly defined space, which the U.S. calls warfare, but it's actually bounded by a set of rules that the U.S. made up. So, if we can move outside the U.S. conceptual framing of what warfare is, we can find space to maneuver.

David Kilcullen: 00:53:24 Now, they don't suggest that China should give up on conventional military capability development. In fact, China hasn't, China's done a lot in improving those capabilities, but they do suggest a whole range of other ways to think about conflict. And I've listed some of them in the book. In fact, I've reproduced a diagram from their book in translation showing how they conceive of a much broader range of things.

David Kilcullen: 00:53:49 Strategic real estate, acquisitions, acquiring control over key technologies, financial warfare, manipulation of markets, information warfare. And remember these guys wrote this book at the infancy of the internet, but they're talking about a whole series of sophisticated online political warfare strategies.

David Kilcullen: 00:54:08 And one of my key questions in reading this book, and I read it when it first came out. I happened to be at the Australian War College year or so after it was issued in translation and I read it when it was very new. One of my key questions at the time was, is this just two guys running their mouths without any authorization? Or is this the official Chinese position? Or is it the view of one particular faction in a fragmented professional debate that's going on in the People's Liberation Army?

David Kilcullen: 00:54:39 And at the time we didn't really have much evidence to answer that. So what I did in this book is I traced the subsequent careers of those two officers to see what happened to them and I reasoned that if they ended up in the Gulag, or they got fired, or they didn't progress in their careers, then probably it wasn't officially endorsed. But if they did well then that might suggest that their ideas were pretty aligned with mainstream thinking.

David Kilcullen: 00:55:05 It turns out that both of them made general rank. One of them ended up as a very senior researcher in the Chinese scientific R&D community and has been very influential in a lot of advanced technology projects that China has worked on. The other one ended up as the head of curriculum development at the main Chinese war college responsible for shaping the strategic thinking of a whole generation of senior Chinese officers.

David Kilcullen: 00:55:32 So I think that answers the question, they were not out of the mainstream and the fact that the Three Warfares doctrine was introduced a few years later drawing very heavily on a lot of their ideas suggests also that they were at least acceptable or formed the basis for official Chinese thinking in the years later.

David Kilcullen: 00:55:53 I don't know if I would go so far as to say that the Chinese have been engaged in warfare against us for 20 years. They have certainly treated us as what military innovators call it, a pacing threat since about the middle of the 1990s. A pacing threat is basically picking a benchmark adversary and working to develop your

capabilities to ensure you can defeat that adversary, and that's definitely how they've thought about us since at least about 1996.

- David Kilcullen:** 00:56:21 But I think when we look at this idea of conceptual envelopment, one of the ideas that I draw on is this idea of horizontal escalation. So, this is an old idea in strategy. It comes from nuclear strategy. The idea is that you can do vertical escalation where you go up and down an escalatory ladder of intensity in one area, or one category of competition, or one war zone.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:56:45 So brinkmanship in the Cuban missile crisis would be an example of vertical escalation. Horizontal escalation is expanding the range of areas of competition, or moving beyond the current geographical focus, or getting into other areas of competition that an adversary may not be paying attention to.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:57:08 And this is a great example of horizontal escalation, and in particular creating a whole set of categories of competition which lie outside our definition of warfare and even if we could conceive these as war, the U.S. military in the U.S. Department of Defense doesn't really have the authorities to deal with them.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:57:28 You mentioned hotel purchases, in the book I talk about Chinese company that was later taken over by the government attempting to buy the Hotel Del Coronado in San Diego Bay in 2016, and that is at the heart of an incredibly dense collection of Naval units, carry a battle groups, Fleet Intelligence Command, Pacific is there, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command is right there that controls all the U.S. global satellite communication systems and this Chinese company wanted to buy essentially a 300 foot tall radio listening post in the middle of that.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:58:06 They were blocked by, I think called CFIUS, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. which decided based on national security concerns to deny the sale. When you look at Europe, and Latin America, and the UK, and elsewhere, these places don't have an equivalent of CFIUS. And what I map out in the book is the extraordinary degree of penetration by Chinese companies of hotels, port operators, road systems, railways, hotel operating groups, container facilities all over Europe and Latin America and elsewhere, which gives them incredibly strong penetration into not only the military systems of Western powers, but all their civilian economic and political systems as well.
- David Kilcullen:** 00:58:57 Now, this isn't necessarily a bad thing. In some ways it's a form of economic interdependence, which might actually make conflict less likely, but it's actually incredible as I've been talking to people in Europe, how few people even think about this stuff in a strategic sense and how few people consider it to have any meaning other than purely commercial. Whereas of course, the Chinese buy their own doctrine, consider it to be part of a much broader war fighting strategy.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:59:28 Where would you rank discussions around 5G and Huawei in Europe, specifically Germany, for example? Where would you rank that and what would the adoption of Chinese 5G technology mean for the Transatlantic Alliance and I guess the security of Western allies?

- David Kilcullen:** 00:59:49 There are two elements here. There's the European group within NATO, so the EU, and then there's the UK, which is part of something we call the Five Eyes Intelligence Sharing Alliance and the implications are different for both. So, in the EU, there is I think a high likelihood that EU countries will allow pretty significant Chinese participation in 5G systems and the U.S. has been pretty unhappy about that.
- David Kilcullen:** 01:00:18 As I mentioned, one of the concepts in unrestricted warfare was gaining control of advanced technologies as a way of shaping the environment and China has been working very hard to dominate the space for supply of the transmission systems, and the wiring systems, and all the ancillary hardware that has to be in place in order for a 5G system to work. And the EU has talked about protecting its data from being acquired by the Chinese.
- David Kilcullen:** 01:00:50 The U.S. is not particularly convinced by the EU approach, but it's also putting the case that just letting China control the supply of all these critical components, even if they don't have access to your data is effectively giving a chokehold over EU systems to China. In the case of the UK, it's quite different.
- David Kilcullen:** 01:01:10 The UK has a bill on the parliament floor right now talking about limiting Chinese participation in their 5G systems to about 35% of component, and the U.S. is extremely unhappy about that and has actually talked about excluding the UK from the Five Eyes Intelligence Sharing arrangement or limiting their access if the UK doesn't in fact exclude China from its systems.
- David Kilcullen:** 01:01:39 There's actually been a revolt by a number of parliamentarians on the floor in the House of Commons this last week attempting to block that bill because of concerns that they'll be excluded from intelligence sharing with the U.S. if they go through with it.
- David Kilcullen:** 01:01:52 In Australia, which is another member of the Five Eyes arrangement, Australia has been extremely hard over on excluding Huawei, which is one of the leading purveyors of this 5G technology from China from critical systems for exactly that reason. So, I think it's going to be an area of... Again, you wouldn't think that micro transmitters, and Silicon chips, and couple of wiring, and fiber optic would be necessarily a zone of major military competition, but in fact they are and that's just a reflection of this conceptual envelopment that we've seen over the 10 to 15 years.
- David Kilcullen:** 01:02:29 And it is a great example of conceptual envelopment because one player here, or a couple of fliers, let's say Australia and the U.S. regard this as an aspect of military grade competition with China, whereas other players, people in the British parliament and governments in the EU don't see it as fitting into a military competition at all. So literally is a conceptual disagreement about whether this is or is not part of warfare.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 01:02:54 So what you're describing here is the likelihood that the foreign adversary is engaged in military competition with us, with Western countries without us knowing, but there's a flip side to this, which you also talk about in the book and that flip side is that we may be perceiving, and this gets to my point about theory of mind early on, which is that we're making assessments.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:03:25 We're making subjective assessments of what our adversaries or Western adversaries are thinking or how they see us and we take actions accordingly and they do the same thing. And so, the flip side of this is the risk that we may see them as engaging in a wartime action or in warlike behavior, when in fact they're actually engaged in a kind of peacetime action, and the same thing goes for us.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:03:58 A great example, Huawei, the arrest of the CEO's daughter, I forget her position at the company up in Canada.

David Kilcullen: 01:04:06 Yeah, vice president.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:04:07 Yeah, that's a great example. The Chinese interpret it one way and the Americans may well interpret it in a different way, and this happens often. In fact, this is kind of the classic problem of diplomacy. We saw this in the Soviet Union going back to the sources of Soviet conduct. There was a great amount of effort put into trying to understand the Soviet mind so that we could effectively negotiate with them and deescalate.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:04:32 I want to ask you about that on the other side of this conversation. We're going to do the second hour, David, as over time. This has been an amazing conversation so far. For regular listeners, you know the drill. If you're new to the program or if you haven't subscribed yet to our audiophile, autodidact, or super nerd tiers, head over to patreon.com/hiddenforces or scroll down to the bottom of the summary to this week's episode and click on the link that sends you to the Patreon page as well as the link that explains how you can integrate the overtime RSS feed into your podcast application of choice so you can listen to it just like you listen to the regular episode.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:05:16 David, stick around. We'll be right back.

David Kilcullen: 01:05:18 Sure.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:05:20 Today's episode of Hidden Forces was recorded at Creative Media Design studio in York city. For more information about this week's episode or if you want easy access to related programming, visit our website at hiddenforces.io and subscribe to our free email list. If you want access to overtime segments, episode transcripts, and show rundowns full of links and detailed information related to each and every episode, check out our premium subscription available through the Hidden Forces website or through our Patreon page patreon.com/hiddenforces.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:05:59 Today's episode was produced by me and edited by Stylianos Nicolaou. For more episodes, you can check out our website at hiddenforces.io. Join the conversation at Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram @HiddenForcesPod, or send me an email.

Demetri Kofinas: 01:06:19 As always, thanks for listening. We'll see you next week.