

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:00:00 Today's episode of Hidden Forces is made possible by listeners like you. For more information about this week's episode, or for easy access to related programming, visit our website at [hiddenforces.io](http://hiddenforces.io) and subscribe to our free email list. If you listen to the show on your Apple podcast app, remember, you can give us a review. Each review helps more people find the show and join our amazing community. And with that, please enjoy this week's episode.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:00:48 What's up everybody? My guest today is Michael Lind, a highly accomplished intellectual, writer, and academic. He's currently a professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He's been an editor or staff writer for the New Yorker, Harper's, the New Republic, and the National Interest, and he's published in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, the Financial Times, you name it. Our conversation today focuses on the subject of Michael's latest book, *The New Class War*. I won't tease too much of that conversation other than to say that it's excellent and it is the first in a series of episodes that I'm working on in the new year dealing with a theme of conflict. Be that class conflict, racial conflict, cyber conflict, or actual, physical conflict.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:01:42 As is always the case, I put a lot of work into the weekly rundowns and this week's rundown is no exception. It's an especially great companion to the full episode as well as to the overtime which goes on for another 45 minutes. So, if you haven't subscribed to that yet or integrated the overtime RSS feed into your podcasting application of choice, I would strongly suggest you do that. As many of you already know, I've elected not to take on corporate sponsors and Hidden Forces is entirely listener funded and we do that by offering all of this premium content that's only available behind the paywall, including early access episodes and transcripts of every conversation.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:02:27 And with that, please enjoy this week's conversation with my guest, professor Michael Lind.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:02:39 Michael Lind, welcome to Hidden Forces.

**Michael Lind:** 00:02:42 Thank you for having me.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:02:43 It's great having you on the program. I read your book, and really liked it. In fact, this subject is something that I've really wanted to explore, and I think that although there are other people...we were just talking before turning on the microphone that Ezra Klein is out with a book either this week or next week, sometime around now dealing with a subject similar to yours. You had done a recording with Ezra around November or so, but this is, I think, the most clearly articulated, if not book, certainly book title on this subject and I think in some ways it will surprise people the perspective you take in the book. The book is called "*The New Class War: Saving Democracy from the Managerial Elite*." Maybe we can back up a moment and you can tell us what led you to write this book based on your experience and sort of career development.

**Michael Lind:** 00:03:33 Well, I first touched on these themes in my first book in 1995 called "*The Next American Nation*," where I built on the analysis of James Burnham, the Trotskyist, who became an early American conservative, in his book, "*The Managerial Revolution*." In 1940, he argued that the Marxists had been wrong.

The capitalists were indeed withering away, the bourgeois capitalists, but they're being replaced by a new group of managers, which he defined broadly in order to include not only corporate executives, but also foundation executives, civil servants, the military. I touched on that in my analysis of what was ... "The Next American Nation" was largely about changing conceptions of race and national identity. So, I touched on class in passing, and then I've thought about it, written a number of other books, particularly exploring the Rooseveltian and the Hamiltonian traditions of political economy.

- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:04:29 We were talking about Walter Russell Mead before. I'd read professor Mead's book in 2003. He deals with some of the subjects as well, and you guys work together.
- Michael Lind:** 00:04:35 Right. And I'd predicted in the earlier book in 1995 that there was going to be a crisis of the neoliberal system and that at some point, probably in the second or third decade of the 21st century, this would erupt. And on schedule, it did. So, I thought I would turn to this again. A new quarterly edited by Julius Krein and Gladden Pappin called "American Affairs" asked me to write for them. They started off as being part of the anti-Bush kind of...at least initially they were pro Trump, but they broke with Trump pretty quickly. American Affairs, at this point they publish mostly central left- and left-wing scholars, but their project was anti-neoliberalism. So, I did the article on which this book is based, called "The New Class War, in 2017." Got a lot of attention and then I had the opportunity to expand it slightly. It's a long essay. It's a short book. And I have to cover a lot of material in a fairly brief pace as you've seen, in 40,000 words, dealing with two centuries of the industrial revolution in class relations. But my argument, I build on James Burnham's thesis about the managerial elite, which influenced John Kenneth Galbraith's ideas about what he called the techno structure and he gave Burnham credit late in life for having influenced him.
- Michael Lind:** 00:06:00 I was privileged to spend a week in Gstaad, Switzerland skiing with John Kenneth Galbraith and one of his best friends, William F. Buckley, Jr. Mr. Liberal and Mr. Conservative were friends. This back in the 1990s. And I rely heavily on a phrase that Galbraith coined countervailing power, which he used initially in terms of business, business relations, but it's become more broadly used now to mean the countervailing power against business of organized labor, of organized consumer movements and so on.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:06:34 Power is a huge ... I mean it's the central theme of the book. In fact, there's a quote in the book of Burnham's, I think there are a number of them, but this one where he says, "No theory, no promises, no mortality, no amount of goodwill, no religion will restrain power. Only power restrains power."
- Michael Lind:** 00:06:53 That's right. And I think to the extent my book is original or at least unusual among contemporary books on these topics, it's my focus on social power as opposed to just money. And Mickey Kaus, a former colleague of mine at the New Republic, coined determine the 1990s, money liberals. These are people in the center left, thinks everything's around money. And I think more broadly there's a tendency for Marxists socialists, for centrist liberals, and for libertarians to disappear power, to eradicate power. And it's all about resources and particularly money. And the thesis of this book is that power is an independent variable and it also exists not only in the political realm, but also in

the economic and cultural realm. These are not really realms where it's simply commerce. You know, in the mass media, these are very concentrated, monopolistic, oligopolistic entities. They have some of the functions of public utilities like search engines. And to say that, well everyone has complete freedom in this marketplace just is absurd, I think. And the same is true in the realm of employment.

- Michael Lind:** 00:08:07 Half of Americans work for firms with 500 or more employees. You know, people are shocked because of all the talk about small business creating jobs and so on. But most people work for big or medium sized firms. And individuals do not have real bargaining power against big corporations. So, what I'm trying to do in this book is it's not just about money. You know that economic inequality has kind of consumed people on the center left in particular, and it's important, but arguably economic inequality follows from powerlessness. It's not just something independent that happened.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:08:46 It's interesting. So, I had a lot of thoughts when you were talking. I wrote a few things down. I'll try to remember as many as I can now while we're going and then I'm sure they'll come up again. To the point about it's not just about money, I think there are two aspects of that that resonate with me based on having read your book. One is that it is quite literally, it isn't just about money. Culture matters. And another one is that in fact, and this was counterintuitive for me, that even the question of economic inequality itself doesn't capture the dynamic of power, which goes back to your point.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:09:18 I should also mention to listeners, I don't know how this came to my mind, but I know you were on a panel with Michael Kazin. I had Michael on my old television show. I read his book, which is a biography of William Jennings Bryan. I want to recommend to listeners if you're interested in this topic, that biography is a great one to read. Also, manageable, not very big, and Bryan is a central figure in the history of American populism and it's something to listen to. I'm sure we'll be touching on all of this stuff. We'll be going back and forth, but your assertion is that we are in a class war and if so, what are the markers? What has given you that insight? What is it that you see that tells you that that's the case?
- Michael Lind:** 00:09:56 Well, it's these populous revolts like the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote in Britain, the yellow vest protests, which became very violent in France and much of the rise of the populist ... We call it the populist right, although most of these voters actually came from social Democratic or labor party backgrounds, or communist party in southern European countries.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:10:19 That's the one other thing we see here in the US, these interesting bedfellows. The fact that there is an alliance or there's like a Venn diagram cross-section of Bernie Sanders supporters and Trump supporters.
- Michael Lind:** 00:10:30 Yeah, and there are basically three theories about this. One is they're deplorables. That was the Hillary Clinton theory. It's the theory of the mainstream Democrats. They're essentially upset with the civil rights revolution and with non-whites having rights and with the immigrants being a growing share of the population. And that explanation I think was quite accurate for the shift of the so-called Dixiecrats, the segregationist Democrats from the

Democratic party to the Republican party in the 1960s and '70s and '80s. I don't think it explains why in the second decade of the 21st century, in all of these different countries with radically different immigration policies, you get similar rebellions concentrated among former center, left voters in de-industrialized era. So, I dismiss not that sure, there's some racial backlash and you know, anti-immigrant nativism. But I don't think that that explanation works.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:11:25 It also ignores the fact that many of these people voted for Obama.

**Michael Lind:** 00:11:29 Well, yeah. And so, if you take that thesis, you have to explain that these racists voted for a black man to be president, but then they were so racist, they voted against a white woman to be president. And you know, I think it's just an alibi. There's another somewhat more plausible account, which is this is the result of rising inequality of income and wealth. And this is some of the people on the further progressive left. And they're in love with this chart, which is a fascinating chart. It shows the decline of inequality from the great depression through the middle of the 20th century, and then it rises again at the end. But if you believe this thesis, then the solution is pretty straightforward. It's just "give them money." Just write them checks.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:12:14 UBI. Andrew Yang's solution.

**Michael Lind:** 00:12:16 Whatever it is. I mean, it can be Medicare for all. And I support a lot of these redistributionist programs, but the assumption is that people do not have power interests and they don't have dignity interests. And it's also a vision of government. My friend Mike Conzell calls it pity charity liberalism. That is a kind of philanthropy. So, I reject both of those, and I argue that power is an independent variable. That is, if people are powerless, they may not be destitute, right? They may not be starving. They'll still be very angry because it goes against human nature. It's humiliating to be powerless. And this shouldn't come as a great surprise, particularly to Americans because the American tradition of Republican liberalism, going back to the American revolution and the civil war is not based on the idea that a good government is one that allocates resources to everyone according to some objective Rawlsian scheme of fairness. A good government is one in which there are checks and balances so that no single elite, no single class, no single region of the country can dominate the other one, even if it temporarily uses that dominance for benign purposes. It cannot be trusted in the long run to be benign.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:13:36 There's another quote in the book of yours that I think sort of speaks a little bit to what you're saying where you're write, "To be complete, representative democracy requires representative bureaucracy." And we'll get into that because that's sort of part of this thing about Democratic pluralism. But I want to go back to this notion of power because I think it's interesting. Because if you reflect on it, if you're solving for the problem of economic and wealth disparity, and this is something that I've focused on a lot in terms of trying to diagnose the issue. After 2016 I think I would fall into the camp of people who were surprised by the election of Donald Trump, but my reaction was not to explain it away easily or look for superficial answers because the idea that we were a racist country or that this was a racist issue or some of the other easy solutions, or it was a Russian conspiracy, again, seemed just totally ludicrous to me.

- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:14:26 And so I tried to dig deeper and for me, this idea of, of an economic issue really resonated with me because I see the giant wealth disparity. I live in New York. I see this, I see how it's changed, especially after 2008 with the redistribution. But what your book does, and I find it helpful and insightful, is that it brings in this notion of power so that when we're talking about something like redistribution or UBI, someone like me or someone who thinking about this purely from an economic standpoint, who also of course, and I do consider the cultural dimensions of this, and I do want to talk about those, could actually be making the problem worse because by simply redistributing the wealth, you're actually exacerbating the power dynamic problem. Correct?
- Michael Lind:** 00:15:11 Yeah, that's exactly it. So, if someone comes to you and says, "I've taken pity on you, I'm here to save you and I'm going to rescue you from poverty or from your enemies or whatever," that's demeaning. Now it may be very noble, but it's quite different from empowering that individual to defend himself or to defend herself.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:15:35 So to take this further, I was thinking about this when I was preparing for the conversation because there's a lot of ... I've done well. I don't fall neatly, I don't know, into your categories. And we should probably get into those. I mean, I come from an immigrant family so that I have that strong immigrant culture, but I'm credentialed. My parents, my father's a physician, my mother has a master's degree. I've done well, but I've been one of those people that has been ... Ticked off, doesn't really quite capture it. I felt a hostility towards what feels like this kind of culture of political correctness and whatever this is exactly. I've had a hard time nailing it down, but it's a feeling of being lorded over. And it's interesting because even I feel that even though I don't feel it from an economic standpoint.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:16:20 I'm also reminded, and I hope I'm not going all over the place now, but we did an episode where we looked at Ted Kaczynski's industrial society and its future, and he talks about the power process there. And I just sort of wonder, again, to go back to the point, is your contention that most of us have really been missing this larger story, that the power dynamic has been shifting dramatically and it has sort of gone under the surface unnoticed and this is what's really driving the conflict?
- Michael Lind:** 00:16:46 Yeah, that's my argument. I argue that the bipartisan establishment with both parties. And it's the vast majority of academics and journalists and intellectuals, I call it a technocratic neo-liberalism. And the idea is there's this public good, which is to be ascertained through ratiocination through research and discussion, maybe in debate, but then once you have ascertained what the public interest is, then this benevolent altruistic elite of technocrats, working for elected politicians will then have a policy. They will have a program and it will solve the social problem, whatever it is. Now, the problem with technocratic progressivism is there is no room for democracy or debate or compromise. What you have is, and I was in the NGO world, it's very much structured like this. The academic world is structured like this. It reflects this early 20th century, sort of Woodrow Wilson progressive technocratic view that there are social problems. There's the inequality problem. There is the labor problem. There's the woman question as they called it in 1900.

- Michael Lind:** 00:18:02 And then you will get these altruistic, brilliant, well educated people. They will come up with a plan. It will be enacted into law by deferential politicians. And then you will save the country and you will save the suffering people. And so, there's no room to actually ask ordinary people what they think should be done or what their concerns are, or what their interests are. It's, it's being done by these intellectuals and technocrats. And at the same time, if you've established the rational moral solution, then anyone who disagrees with that policy is irrational and immoral by definition. So, we've drifted so far in that direction, I think, there's an inevitable backlash from below.
- Michael Lind:** 00:18:49 It's a destructive backlash. It's a dangerous backlash. I'm not a defender of populism. I think it's destructive. But I think you have to recognize what has gone wrong in societies like the present day west, like the American South, between the civil war and the civil rights revolution. Like some of the cities in the north and in the middle of the 20th century where you get populous demagogues. And it's because of an underlying lack of inclusion and incorporation of ordinary people in institutionalized structures so that their anger builds up and goes up and builds up and then there's an explosion.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:19:30 So I think this would be a good time to actually bring some historical context to this conversation because you do that in the book. Specifically, you look at the first and perhaps second industrial, the overall industrial revolution of the 19th and maybe even early 20th century, though I think primarily 19th. Why did you pick that era to look at and what are some of the similarities? What lessons can we draw? How does that help us?
- Michael Lind:** 00:19:56 Well, I argue we're actually in the fifth act of a play. The first act was the development of these classes of the urban landless industrial proletariat. People selling their labor for a wage. This was a completely new group in all of human history. And so, you had these two classes. First the capitalists and the proletarians. And the capitalists were succeeded by the managers as these small owner operated businesses got replaced by giant bureaucratic firms and they replaced what had been the major classes in civilized societies, which had been the landlords and the peasants. And immediately there was a clash. The first class war before the world war one and world war II and the capitalist usually won. They were crushing attempts to organize labor and social reform. So, then you go to act two and that was the world wars in the west. And the governments in the Western democracies in order to defeat Imperial Germany, and then later the fascist powers, imposed class compromise on employers, but also on unions. They also disciplined unions.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:21:11 The FDR period. The new deal era.
- Michael Lind:** 00:21:13 Yeah. But even if you go back to Woodrow Wilson, when the US enters World War I, he makes Samuel Gompers part of the government, the head of the AFL. And you've got a similar kind of tripartite government business labor compact, sometimes called corporatism in the U S and the UK. And then afterwards it became the template in Western Europe for Christian democracy in Germany, for Gaullism, for social democracy in more left leaning European countries. And that was kind of a top down thing. It was in the interest of national unity. So that lasted up until the 1960s and '70s and then the next act in the drama is the neoliberal period where these institutions that had counterbalanced the power

of the elite, the trade unions in the economic sector or the churches and religious groups, synagogues were very powerful in this period, influencing and censoring the media and Hollywood.

- Michael Lind:** 00:22:13 And then you had the parties in this era, on both sides of the Atlantic were federations of local chapters. They were not what they are now, which is just free floating labels. So, as those institutions that had amplified the power of working class people deteriorated, you got this increasing consolidation of cultural, economic, and political power in what is increasingly a very homogeneous elite. In my lifetime, I'm 57, if you go back to the '70s and '80s I remember business elite lived in a totally different world from the academics. And the academics, they went and saw different movies and they had different diets and all of that. Had nothing to do with the media people. They were a completely different group. Journalists-
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:22:58 The media people were also primarily blue collar.
- Michael Lind:** 00:23:00 Right. Right. It was Ben Hecht. It was the kind of blue collar reporters. Now, it doesn't matter whether you're at Google, whether you're an executive agency, whether you're in a Hollywood studio, tends to be ivy league educated people. They dress the same, they have similar tastes, similar values. And so, you have this consolidation and this homogeneity at the elite level that at the very same time that the last strings that connect powerful institutions to ordinary working class people have snapped or been broken.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:23:35 So you're saying this is by your definition class is primarily defined by pedigree?
- Michael Lind:** 00:23:40 Well, I argue that in the Western world today, diplomas are more inherited than earned. This is controversial, I realize, but it's clearly the case. Class historically is defined by the status of your parents. It's not where you end up. It's the family you're born into. That's why all social satire, going back to juvenile in ancient Rome, and Moliere, and the Beverly Hillbillies is based on the idea of the lower born person who makes lots of money and is a vulgar [inaudible 00:24:09]. So, it's the status of your parents. It's not what you personally accomplish.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:24:15 That's how you can have nouveau riche versus old money. That distinction exists despite the fact that the nouveau riche could have twice as much money as the old money.
- Michael Lind:** 00:24:23 Yeah, so I think the same concept applies to nouveau credentialed and old credentials. And as I cite the data in my book, low scoring students from the top of the socioeconomic scale are far more likely to get bachelor's degrees than high scoring students from the very bottom. Now, we have a degree of meritocracy. I'm not denying that in college education.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:24:47 But it's overstated in your views?
- Michael Lind:** 00:24:48 It's overstated. And that is status in both the working class and the college credential managerial class is partly hereditary and partly not. And if you think about it that way, then meritocracy really cannot be the answer for the disparities of power. And John Steinbeck had this wonderful phrase temporarily embarrassed millionaires. And I think for a lot of both center right and center

left people, working class people are temporarily embarrassed professionals. They're just people who haven't yet gotten their BA or their master's degree. Haven't gone to the university. Or in the case of some of the meritocratic thinkers on the right, they just haven't started their own business and their own startup and made a fortune yet. And I think this is a kind of ideological fiction because it erases the actual persistent intergenerational differences among the managerial class and the working class in the Western democracies.

- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:25:52 I'm not fully following some aspect of what you're saying here. So, let's focus in on this little point about that meritocracy cannot solve this problem. This idea that if we were to build a perfect union where everyone had an equally good shot at building a future, you're saying that would be insufficient?
- Michael Lind:** 00:26:09 Well, society wouldn't function because there's only a limited number of jobs that require college education. According to the Bureau of labor statistics, if you look at the top 10 occupations where you have the greatest growth in absolute number of jobs in the next decade, they tend to fall into three categories. Retail, and hospitality, and leisure, and home healthcare. Or healthcare in general. And leisure and hospitality are a single category. According to the BLS, only one job of the top 10 requires any education beyond high school and on the job training. That's registered nurse. None of the other jobs that are being created in the greatest numbers in the US, and this is true in Europe as well, require a college education.
- Michael Lind:** 00:26:58 So when we are told again and again that to increase your wealth and your income, you need to go to college, all you're going to do is get a bunch of people with JDs and MAs and PhDs who are baristas at Starbucks. It's been estimated 10%, 15%, maybe more of jobs being done by college graduates in the United States now do not require college diplomas. Now from a classical new deal, liberal, laborist, union point of view, these are perfectly legitimate jobs. Being a home health aide or being a waiter. They're underpaid and have low benefits because of the lack of bargaining power on the part of waiters and health AIDS. Not because they don't have enough years of education, which they don't need to perform those jobs.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:27:48 That's an interesting point. Let's see if we can clarify it further for me and maybe for the listeners because it brings back this point about power. The way in which the wealth income gap has been explained is that there are temporary stop measures or stop gaps or ways to help bridge the gap, which is to provide some kind of redistribution. UBI, whatever. Andrew Yang for example, talks about this \$1,000 a month dividend so that despite whatever happens, you've got that cushion that keeps you safe while you try and sort of get that new job or evolve into the next class. But the idea long-term is that the economy will evolve as it always has and that these jobs will go away, but these people will educate themselves and find new ones. And you're saying the evidence just doesn't point to that. That that's just not how things happen.
- Michael Lind:** 00:28:38 Yeah, and it's a misreading of economic history. Being a steelworker was a terribly poorly paid job in the 1920s. In the 1950s it was a very well-paying job. Great benefits, all of this. Were the steelworkers more educated in 1950 than in 1920? No. Did they have greater human capital? No. Well, what did they have? They had unions which boosted their wages, which forced their employers to

share more of their profits from production. You have to have a minimum amount of productivity obviously in order to pay for both profits and wages, but they shifted the profit share more into the wage share because of collective bargaining. You also had, and I'll be a little technical here, it's what political scientists call de-commodification. That is, you remove certain things from bargaining among employees and employers. For social security. Once you know you won't be destitute when you're old, then that actually strengthens the bargaining power of workers because you no longer have to save that money. You know it's being taxed. You know it's being saved for you by the government.

- Michael Lind:** 00:29:45 But certain things like unemployment insurance allows workers to hold out longer in negotiations with employers so that the employers have to make a better deal. So, the combination of collective bargaining and de-commodification, which this wasn't just social democracies, it was Christian Democratic Germany, it was Eisenhower's US and Nixon's US. But these increased the bargaining power of the working class as a class against the employer class. Now had we done things differently, suppose that the steel companies and the auto companies had continued to successfully crush unions, but the home health AIDS were unionized in 1950, 1960. Then we would think of home health jobs as being like really good jobs with benefits.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:30:34 That's really interesting.
- Michael Lind:** 00:30:35 Right? Whereas there was something inherently low wage about steelworker jobs. Right? And so, it's missing the critical factors, which are government policy and collective bargaining.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:30:46 Very interesting. So, I want to clarify something before we move forward because we're going to come back to it. When we were talking about the ending of the first class war and how it ended and the important role that the threat of foreign invasion or foreign conquest or World War II essentially. Beginning with actually Woodrow Wilson, World War I played. And now fast forward to ... Well, I mean the deregulation of finance began really under Carter with the monetary control act, 1979 or so. And you could maybe even talk about Bretton Woods, but the cold war ended in '89. And how much did the emergence of the United States as a global hegemon and the ending of the cold war and the end of history, how much did that play a role in the breakdown of this Democratic, pluralistic consensus that had existed in the United States pretty much since the end of world war II until the late 1970s?
- Michael Lind:** 00:31:45 Well, I would say it was globalization and not simply the emergence of the US as the only superpower. If you go all the way up to the 1970s, offshoring was really not possible because most of the rest of the world outside of the US and Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and its Western European allies were either communist, a third of the human race lived under Marxist-Leninist regimes, or they were protectionist. Most of the Latin American countries, the post-colonial African countries had an import substitution, very protectionist regimes. So, with the end of the cold war two things happened. First, the incentive on the part of Western elites to maintain labor peace and good cross class relations to keep the country together against its enemy ... The enemy disappeared, and so did the urgency of having the nation state broker this cross class piece. At the same

time, there was a conversion of Mexico, most importantly of China, but also India.

- Michael Lind:** 00:32:46 Many of these countries in the 1990s opened up their labor markets to multinational corporations. Now, if multinationals had been able to move their car production, say to Mexico or China in 1945 they would have done so. Probably. It's just, that wasn't something even possible up until the 1990s but once it became possible as a result of the liberalization of policies and these other countries, not just the US, you got this, what I call a global labor arbitrage in the book.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:33:22 But how much was that a result of the fact that the cold war had ended or was perceived to have ended, and there was the specter of global peace and this ideology that developed, which was that we want to create a global order and everyone lives in some global community? And we saw, of course, microcosms of that to the extent that you could even call 500 million people microcosms, but the European Union, for example.
- Michael Lind:** 00:33:46 Well yeah, it was sincere on both sides. The former protectionist third world countries had concluded, well, the US and the West won the cold war. I guess capitalism is the future. Not socialism.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:33:57 Exactly.
- Michael Lind:** 00:33:57 Right? So, we want to get in on the capitalist game. The only resource we have if you're not petrol state is the large pool of poor people. So, we'll try to rent our poor people to corporations and then maybe we'll have some kind of industrial policy and gradually rise up in the ranks on the part of the US and Europe. And in retrospect, it seems crazy. I thought it was crazy at the time. I was quite a Maverick in the '90s and 2000s defending national industrial policy for security reasons, but the US and the Europeans were so relaxed that for about 20 years it was thought that there would never be a great power threat again.
- Michael Lind:** 00:34:33 That is, China would be kind of like a big South Korea or Mexico, would be a maquiladora, would never be a significant military challenger. And the great challenge came from two sources. So called rogue States with weapons of mass destruction like Iraq or Iran, and stateless terrorists.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:34:53 Stateless terrorism. Yeah, that was the early 2000s. Or even late '90s with the project for the new American century. That was a big part of their plank. So, this is super interesting. I mentioned to you before we started recording that I'm going to have Joshua Yaffa on next, and I read his book *Between Two Fires*. It's an anthropological socio graphic history of post-Soviet Russia. And what I want to try and capture here and see if we can talk about it somehow is this notion that grew up after the end of the cold war.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:35:25 I mean the cold war was an ideological battle, right? I mean there were all these other interests obviously, but there was a story that the populations of east and west were told. They were taking part in a larger historical experiment or battle. And with the end of the cold war, that story of higher ideals of fighting either for religion or for the proletariat or whatever, was replaced with this idea of wealth consumerism sort of buying your way into heaven in a sense. Not exactly, but

you even touched on when we talk about China. The idea even with China was everything was universally seen through this lens. It was that the Chinese, they're not concerned about their thousands of years of history or these sorts of political machinations or whatever. None of that matters. Once they get a taste of American capitalism, they're going to come home. They're going to come and they're going to come to the fold, and this is what the future of the world is.

- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:36:20 How important is it in your view, or how necessary is it for the world to function for people to have more than just simply money as a motivating factor for their lives?
- Michael Lind:** 00:36:32 Oh, I think the most profound motive for most human beings who are social primates is having connection. It's being part of some kind of group. And it can take very bad forms in terms of inter-group relations, with the family, the tribe, the clan, the nation, the civilization. And that's why I was always very skeptical about this neoliberal triumphalism. Frank Fukuyama's, a friend of mine, you know, the end of history, but I never bought that thesis just for psychological reasons. And the dominant neoliberal consensus was a kind of inverted Marxism that is just as in Marxism, the ideology is the superstructure and the underlying structure is material. So, there was this idea that capitalism generates liberty and it generates democracy.
- Michael Lind:** 00:37:25 And so once you have all of the capitalists and people in China, you have a capitalist economy, then they will demand human rights, they will demand democracy. I had a debate with my colleagues at the New Republic in the 1990s, they were very pro NAFTA, and their theory was the same thing that Mexico will develop economically first and then it will become liberal socially and so on. And it was just a historical-
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:37:52 And then we'll just create one giant North American country with the Amero.
- Michael Lind:** 00:37:55 Exactly. Right.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:37:56 It's pretty wild. Just like the European Union. It's amazing the euphoria. One of the things that we've talked about in this program before was that the same mechanism that was viewed as a lubricant for European Union, which was essentially rolling economic crises, would essentially create an opportunity for ever closer union, have now begun to tear it apart.
- Michael Lind:** 00:38:16 Yeah, that's right. It's this kind of determinist theory of history, which has no basis in history because authoritarian capitalism has always existed, and you've always had regimes where the capitalists and the managers have looked to a strong non-democratic state to protect them from the workers. The extensions of power to non-whites, to the working class, to non-elite groups usually have been resisted by capitalists and by business elites. But you got this weird, as I say, it was inverted Marxism. Particularly, if you look at a lot of the third way people in Tony Blair's labor party and some of the Clintonites, they'd been new left radicals in the 19, and Trotskyists in the '60s and '70s. And they just had one little twist in their view. Silicon Valley and wall street capitalists, it turned out were the vanguard of world revolution, not steelworkers and automobile workers, right, in the old labor metaphysic. So, they made that one little twist and then they could think that well by helping Apple and helping Google and

helping Microsoft, they were bringing about this great glorious global, cosmopolitan, individualistic society. So, I knew a lot of these people. I think they were quite sincere. They were just wrong.

- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:39:38 There was also this idea of a transnational piece. And to be fair, it makes sense on some level, the same animating force behind the European Coal and Steel Community, which became the European Union, which was that we've seen how devastating nationalism can be on the international stage. We've seen tens of millions of people murdered in wars, like World War II. How can we do better? And I think that was a big part of what neoliberal hegemony was.
- Michael Lind:** 00:40:05 Well, neoliberal peace theory came in two versions. There was liberal peace theory that it was commerce. That is economic interdependence would cause peace. And this had been a 19th century theory.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:40:16 Norman Angell.
- Michael Lind:** 00:40:17 Exactly. And the fact that imperial Germany's biggest trading partner before World War I was Russia, I think kind of trashed that.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:40:25 Same thing is held by the way with the US and China.
- Michael Lind:** 00:40:27 Yeah. Yeah. And then you also had Democratic peace theory. That is democracies don't go to war with each other. The problem from a social science point of view is that modern universal suffrage democracies really have existed in great numbers only since 1945 and almost all of them in the last half century, since 1945 or longer than that, were satellites or client states of one country, the United States. And like the Europeans and NATO. So, they attributed their lack of conflict to the European Coal and Steel Community and the common market in the EU. Yeah, but the fact that they were actually protectorates of the United States.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:41:07 I also never bought that theory because I understand that technically the theory was that they would never go to war with each other. We've seen at least empirically that democracies themselves, whether it's the Athenian direct democracy of the fifth century BC or the United States, are hyper aggressive.
- Michael Lind:** 00:41:24 Well look, the founding myth of the European Union is that the world wars were caused by everybody's nationalism. Now, from a historical perspective, I disagree with this. It was caused by German imperialism. Germany was not content after being unified under Bismarck with being the largest, most influential German nation state, but a second tier world power compared to the British empire and the United States and eventually Russia or the Soviet Union. They wanted to conquer Europe to become a superpower. If not for German imperialism, I do not believe for a moment that the British and French and Russians would have gone to war with each other. But this really is the fundamental ... It's an alibi for the Germans. And I have many German friends and I respect the modern federal Republic. But when the European Union is constantly saying, well we're the antidote to nationalism, which caused the world wars, Swedish nationalism didn't cause the world wars. Polish nationalism most certainly didn't cause the world wars. French nationalism didn't. It was German imperialism.

**Michael Lind:** 00:42:29 So this anti national narrative, which is stronger in Europe than it is in the United States, I think it's based on a kind of tendentious misreading of history that lets the Germans off the hook for the two German Wars.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:42:42 And they also have quite a bit of a mess on their hands out. Not the Germans, the Europeans with the Euro project. One of the things I want to talk about, and this would probably be a good opportunity to discuss it, because you mentioned it a little bit when we were talking about ... Or we discussed it when we were talking about the reaction that some people had to the 2016 election. I, for example, how I reacted to it and trying to dig deeper and really understand what was driving this. But another unfortunate reaction has been to grab some very, very simple and I think not very compelling theories.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:43:17 We touched on two of those. One is that the country is consisting of 40% or 45 or whatever number of just racists. White supremacists, people that want to roll back the clock to the 1950s, or xenophobes. What accounts for this dehumanization or demonization of the Trump voter and how significant is this in your view?

**Michael Lind:** 00:43:40 I think the significance is very dangerous. Generally, when establishments are confronted with real revolutionary dissent that threatens their power and their status, they won't admit that they have done anything wrong that could have provoked this. Instead, it must be an occult conspiracy of some sorts. So, if you look at the wars of the French revolution, the French elite and the conservatives in Europe and Britain were convinced it was the machinations of the Freemasons and the Jews. And depending on the country, they added the Protestants or the Catholics, depending on the country, whether it's Catholic or Protestant.

**Michael Lind:** 00:44:17 And it was a conspiracy. If you look at the south in the United States during the civil rights era, after World War II, it was outside agitators. Black people in the south were happy. They didn't object to segregation.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:44:29 It was the Robert F. Kennedy's and the-

**Michael Lind:** 00:44:30 Yeah, and Martin Luther King and the communists and the New York Jews, and you name it were stirring up trouble in this happy society. And the equivalent of this now for Clinton Democrats and for some never Trump Republicans is Vladimir Putin. So, this Russian conspiracy theory as the structure of a classic conspiracy theory, certainly classic anti-Masonic or anti-Jewish-

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:44:57 It's a wild one because the broad brush with which the media and the Democrats have painted the "Russians", the early commitment to impeachment before we even got the results of the Mueller investigation, forget even the call with Zelensky. The process has become so politicized that people have just checked out.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:45:14 They're not even interested in following it anymore. And meanwhile, former Secretary of State and the 2016 nominee for the Democratic party, Hillary Clinton goes and calls Tulsi Gabbard a "Russian asset". I mean, no one-

- Michael Lind:** 00:45:28 It's crazy. I saw a poll that a majority of Democrats believes that the Russians actually changed the votes that hadn't been cast in voting machines, which is impossible because the voting machines in 2016 were not connected to the internet. So, Putin and his superhuman genius trolls have these incredible powers, almost magical powers. It's kind of like those old comic books where the joker would appear on TV in Gotham city, in the Batman comic and hypnotize everybody with with patterns. It really is that simple and stupid. The premise, as far as I can gather, is that Hillary Clinton lost because of two groups did not vote the same way that they had in the previous presidential elections.
- Michael Lind:** 00:46:15 There was less African American turnout than for Barack Obama. And there was a switch in some of these key states among mostly white working class voters who had voted for Obama and then they switched to Trump. Well, there were perfectly rational explanations of this. Of course, African American voters were not as motivated to vote for Hillary Clinton as they had been for the first black president. Obama had gotten those votes in the Midwest because he had bailed out the car industry against Romney, who looked like the guy who wanted them all back-
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:46:45 In 2012, you're talking about.
- Michael Lind:** 00:46:46 Right. 2012. And then Trump promised to bring back manufacturing jobs. So, you can explain both the lower African American turnout and the switch from the Obama Trump voters. Perfectly rational explanation. We're supposed to believe that incredibly psychologically cunning intranet memes that we're deliberately targeted to these two groups, African Americans and white working class swing voters. The swing voters had been identified by these twenty-something trolls in Moscow or wherever, who are vastly better at doing American politics than all of these American Democratic and Republican political consultants. And then they chose exactly the right image of Hillary Clinton with devil's horns or some meme, some clever joke, which would hypnotize these Americans so that they were, I was going to vote for Hillary, but I was hypnotized by this Russian meme on the internet.
- Michael Lind:** 00:47:46 And if you look at these two groups, which are disproportionately non college educated, we know that they don't spend that much time on the internet and Twitter and Facebook compared to college educated people. So, the whole thing is kind of like the protocols of the elders of Zion, except instead of the Jews, it's the Russians. And it's not just the US. It's not just the US. Vladimir Putin supposedly is the hidden hand behind Brexit, behind the yellow vest protests against the diesel tax. Now there's no doubt, let me be clear, the Russians have this residual post-Cold War agency that tries to sow dissension. I think they'd be unemployed otherwise. So, they do these memes and things like that. There is zero evidence that anyone voted for Brexit because they were brainwashed by these Russian things. Even if they show up among millions of memes on the internet. There's zero evidence that a single American voter in 2016 was influenced by any of this.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:48:52 I mean, there's no doubt that there are many verticals of disinformation, almost all of them domestic. That the Russian intelligence agencies have gotten better at creating or amplifying the noise in the system, there's no doubt of this either. But it ignores the larger, most obvious fact that's obvious to the rest of us. This

is what's so confounding. And you could see it in Hillary Clinton's ... I don't know if you're familiar, if you saw this, that she's going to be out with a Hulu documentary. And she did an interview recently with the Hollywood reporter saying that no one likes Bernie Sanders. It's just you've seen it obviously. Right?

- Michael Lind:** 00:49:28 No. I've read about it. I read about the cause.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:49:29 It's astounding because no one likes her. No one likes Hillary Clinton. No one likes her husband, or they liked her husband for a while, but they've become increasingly less popular. And there seems to be a, just a total deafness.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:49:44 Another example, this brings us back to these identitarian narratives because Hillary keeps banking on this. Her point attacking Bernie Sanders as well, saying that it's also his Bernie bros and they're particularly bad against women and Elizabeth Warren, who in an effort, it seems to get some attention, create some controversy, claimed that Bernie Sanders is in some way a misogynist because supposedly he told her that a woman will never win. I mean, the idea that these people think that this works, that these superficial explanation of the problem, that it's simply that we live in a misogynistic, racist society doesn't comport with the lived experience of most Americans.
- Michael Lind:** 00:50:22 Yeah, that's absolutely right. And people like Zack Goldberg, who's a scholar, and Thomas Edzell, a New York Times columnists, they've documented how the so-called woke left, it's a very elite white left is much more committed to identitarianism than the people they are supposedly defending, African Americans and Latino Americans, who have much more moderate views of all of this stuff.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:50:48 I have a number of Muslim friends and many Hispanic friends and I will tell you that many of them voted for Donald Trump. And I think that would shock, shock many people on the left. So that comes and goes to a different point. This brings us maybe to a question about culture and there are some more things I want to talk about with the demonization of Trump voters. But this brings us back to a question of culture, which is that cultural values matter. And this also intersects with homo-economics, is this neoliberal idea that man is a rational economic agent and that he, she makes decisions in a very rational, cold, calculated way and that the Trump voter is just stupid because he's voting against his economic self-interest, just like almost every Republican voter because it's not in his economic interest to vote for tax cuts and et cetera, et cetera. But culturally, I think that the Democratic left, so to speak, again, to draw generalization, really under appreciates the extent to which immigrants like Hispanics and Muslims value family and value a sense of economic independence. And I think that in the cases that I'm familiar with, these people prefer that and they're less concerned with some of the sort of dog whistles that might come out of Donald Trump's mouth.
- Michael Lind:** 00:52:05 I think that's right. Without getting too much into Trump, I would just make the point that most people take their political cues from members of their communities, whatever that community can be. It may be ethnic, it may be racial, it may be regional. And successful political parties and movements, they have spokespeople within those communities. This is called identity vouching in political science. That is, if I go to a Mexican American community in South

Texas and say, well, this is what you should do, well, okay, I'm an outsider to that particular community. If you get someone who's pillar of the community, he says, well, this is what we should do, then it has much more credibility.

- Michael Lind:** 00:52:52 And the Democrats, largely because of the collapse of the power of the trade unions in the United States ... You really cannot underestimate how devastating this has been for the Democratic party since the trade unions from Franklin Roosevelt all the way up until Bill Clinton were the base. And it was trans racial, they supported civil rights, but they also incorporated great numbers of working-class whites into the structure and then the local union guy could explain, this is Democratic party line, this is why it makes sense. Rather than having Rush Limbaugh or somebody explain it on the radio. And at the same time, the Democrats in Washington could hear back from the grassroots. And with that structure gone, you have people who are completely disconnected from politics to the extent they follow it at all. It's through kind of sensationalistic media. In the case of the right, it's Rush Limbaugh, it's Breitbart, it's things like that. And so, they become prey to demagogues.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:53:55 Exactly. It opens the door to demagoguery and also to celebrity politicians.
- Michael Lind:** 00:53:59 Right.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:54:00 To celebrity.
- Michael Lind:** 00:54:01 And again, this is a pan-western world transatlantic phenomenon. You had the TV comedian, Beppe Grillo in Italy, becomes a superstar with his own independent populous party.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:54:14 Ukraine.
- Michael Lind:** 00:54:15 Ukraine. That's right, you got the guy who played a-
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:54:18 President on television. It's just ridiculous.
- Michael Lind:** 00:54:23 Given the gravity of impeachment, I shouldn't laugh. But essentially, it's over whether the reality TV star who became president of the United States pressured the Ukrainian comedian who became president of Ukraine by playing a Ukrainian president on TV. So, this is a bad thing. I think when your ordinary structures of politics have broken down to the extent that you're getting more and more celebrity outsider politicians, this is not healthy. And as I argue in *The New Class War*, if we don't want to go back and forth between out of touch establishments and these outsider celebrities, sometimes they're millionaires or billionaires and self-finance politicians, maverick business executives and you know, actors or actresses or wrestlers like Jesse Ventura, Donald Trump's friend and former ally. When Ventura and Trump tried to take over the reform party. In the early 2000s they tried to take over Ross Perot's reform party.
- Demetri Kofinas:** 00:55:24 Interesting thread, right? The Perot, maybe a little bit with Buchanan, Jesse Ventura. It's an interesting thread that runs through that history.

**Michael Lind:** 00:55:33 Well see, I think the metropolitan media gets this wrong because of their whole Bull Connor narrative that everything is just the ... It's a delayed backlash against the civil rights act.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:55:44 Yeah. I just don't understand where that comes from.

**Michael Lind:** 00:55:46 What they do is they draw a line between George Wallace and that was a backlash against racial integration. And then Pat Buchanan who was saying we should have stayed out of World War II and so on. I mean far, far right. But if you draw a line from Perot to Ventura and Trump, it's quite a different story. If you look at Ross Perot got bigger vote as a third-party candidate than anybody since Theodore Roosevelt running as a progressive party candidate.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:56:15 A lot of young voters too, didn't he?

**Michael Lind:** 00:56:17 Yeah, but the interesting thing about Perot is he bombed in the south, even though he was a Texan with a distinct twang and a kind of southern populous flavor. Most of his supporters were moderates, white working-class voters in the industrial states in the north. And I just saw there was a study the other day that looked at Trump's base of support and they said it actually wasn't real right-wing types. It was these kinds of moderate Sherod Brown lunch bucket Democrats. Yeah. And so, there is kind of a logic to Trump, if you think of Trump being the heir to Ross Perot rather than the heir to Buchanan or Wallace.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:56:55 Very interesting. I moved around a lot as a kid and I live for four years in York, Pennsylvania. And I was there during the '92 election and I remember how popular Ross Perot was in Pennsylvania.

**Michael Lind:** 00:57:06 Well, his theme was de-industrialization and manufacturing and these-

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:57:10 They loved him.

**Michael Lind:** 00:57:11 All of that.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:57:12 They loved him. So, there's so much more I want to discuss. We have another hour. I want to talk a little bit about the comparing the Trump administration and the Trump base to Weimar, Germany, Nazi Germany and sort of look at some of the history of that. We touched on it before, but I want to sort of touch on it explicitly, which is this presumption by Democrats that there is this blue wave. And that looking at it very much from an identitarian lens and maybe missing some of the things that we've discussed.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 00:57:38 But before we do that, I just want to make a quick note. You talked about wokeness. There's a great quote in the book and for listeners who are subscribers to our super nerd tier and have access to these rundowns, I've got a lot of links from the book in this week's rundown. But there's a great quote where you write, "The evolution of managerialism in the west has replaced the distant and snobbish, but thankfully indifferent bosses of the post 1945 years with a new woke corporate elite." Let's just touch on this a little bit and we'll move into the overtime. But what is this that we're seeing this wokeness and this virtue signaling and this thing that so many of us find distasteful. So much so that someone like Joe Rogan for example, has an enormous audience and so

many of us love to tune in, especially during the period when it was really off the chain and you had people like Eric Weinstein, Sam Harris, Jordan Peterson, you had all these people become sort of celebrities because people were looking for an outlet of sanity in this wokeness. What is this thing?

- Michael Lind:** 00:58:42 Well, I think you can interpret it ... They call it the great awakening. A play on the great awakening, a religious revival. I do think you see it ... There is a religious element to it. The dominant group in the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries was northern white mainline Protestants. And mainline Protestantism has collapsed. But these are still elite people. The Episcopalians and the Presbyterians. And so not the evangelicals. They were looked down on. And not the Catholics. And not the Jews. But even groups, whether you were Jewish or Catholic or whatever, you aspired status in the United States. You sort of emulated this wasp, white Anglo Saxon, Protestant, mainline culture. And I think although secularization is most advanced among the children and grandchildren of these folks, and also the people who assimilate to that model, you can't repress religious impulses. They will manifest themselves one way or another.
- Michael Lind:** 00:59:45 But what's interesting to me as a Texan from totally outside of that system ... I mean, I went to school in the northeast and I've lived on the east coast most of my life. But what's interesting to me is the enemies of wokeness, the Catholic church and southern white evangelicals, are the historic enemies of the northeastern mainline Protestants who hated the Catholics. I mean, anti-Catholicism was much deeper than antisemitism in the northeastern elite. And of course, they always saw the southern evangelicals as a bunch of toothless, hillbilly barbarians who were going to destroy civilization. And you're seeing more and more of this. Beto, for example, my fellow Texan, comes from very rich Protestant family. Proposed stripping the tax exemption from churches that don't agree with liberalism. So just historically you go back to, there was a guy named Brand Blanshard in the '50s and '60s, wrote all these best sellers, old stock New Englander, about the threat of the papacy and the Vatican to secular civilization.
- Michael Lind:** 01:00:50 And you really cannot understand the modern Democratic party, I'm saying this as a historian, unless you understand that they are the liberal Republicans of the 1950s and '60s. They are the Rockefeller-
- Demetri Kofinas:** 01:01:02 The Rockefeller Republicans.
- Michael Lind:** 01:01:03 So what were the Rockefeller Republicans' values? They were fiscal conservatives. They didn't want big deficits. They wanted to balance the budget. They were for free trade. They were based in the professions and in the corporate suite. They tended to favor immigration because they were the employer class. But at the same time, what were their big social issues? It was contraception in those days. It was legalizing contraception and abortion and it was environmentalism. Conservation, they called it in the '50s and '60s. So, you go back to the Democrats of that period, they were economically liberal in the sense they were pro-union and pro social security. They were much more socially conservative than the Republican party was because they were working class.

**Michael Lind:** 01:01:49 Many of them, the European immigrants were largely Catholic and traditional. And then they were allied with rural white Protestant southerners and also African Americans in the civil rights movement who were conservative socially. And still are to some degree. So, I think when you look at it that way, the base of the modern so-called left, it's this kind of strange alliance of liberal Republicans, old Rockefeller Republicans. Including Hillary Clinton who told me one time, I was their guest at the White House at a dinner, that she had been a Republican all the way up until college. She had been a Goldwater girl.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 01:02:27 Yeah, I think she's talked about that. Yeah.

**Michael Lind:** 01:02:27 A liberal Republican, not a conservative Republican. So, I see the Democrats as an alliance of the liberal Republicans with the new left from the '60s. Well, this really has nixed and nothing to do with the Roosevelt coalition of farmer and laborer. Except the overlap was there were some Northern progressives like Franklin Roosevelt himself, who was a progressive Republican when he was at Harvard and only became a Democrat later.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 01:02:54 So I want to continue this part of the conversation. I want to make mention, when you talked about Beto O'Rourke and you mentioned he was looking to take away the tax exemption of the church.

**Michael Lind:** 01:03:04 For non-liberal churches.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 01:03:05 Right. So, the weakening of institutions like churches goes to your larger point about the weakening of Democratic pluralism. And that's a sort of tease in that. I want to discuss that as part of the how you see that we get out of this. Right. It brings us back to the two questions, which is fear of an uprising or fear of foreign invasion. Which is it going to be, and how does that work? I also want to discuss immigration. Huge topic. We haven't had a chance to get that. You talk very eloquently on that subject. I also, but when we're going to move into the overtime, I want to continue on this point about wokeness and specifically talking about ... I don't even think it's fair to call it political correctness.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 01:03:40 It's not really, it's more than that. There's a type of policing of speech and a lording over that many people across the political divide have sort of really, there's a backlash against it I feel, and I want to explore it a bit more. For regular listeners, you know the drill. If you're new to the program or if you haven't subscribed yet to our audio file, autodidact or super nerd tiers, head over to [patreon.com/hiddenforces](https://patreon.com/hiddenforces), or go down to the description to this week's episode and look for a link as well as a link to instruction on how to integrate the Patreon overtime RSS feed to your favorite podcasting application so you can listen to the overtime for this week's episode just like you listened to the regular podcast. Michael, it was great having you on. Please stick around so we can continue this conversation.

**Michael Lind:** 01:04:30 Thanks. I will.

**Demetri Kofinas:** 01:04:33 Today's episode of Hidden Forces was recorded at Creative Media Design Studio in New York City. For more information about this week's episode, or if you want easy access to related programming, visit our website at [hiddenforces.io](https://hiddenforces.io) and subscribe to our free email list. If you want access to overtime segments,

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